The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction Between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values by Korsgaard, Christine
 
The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction Between
Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Korsgaard, Christine. 1993. The reasons we can share: An attack
on the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral values.
In Altruism, ed. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller, and
Jeffrey Paul. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Previously
published in Social Philosophy and Policy 10, no. 1: 24-51.
Published Version http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=SOY
Accessed February 17, 2015 10:15:33 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3196321
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAAThe Reasons We Can Share 
An Attack on the Distinction between  
Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values
i 
 
Christine M. Korsgaard 
Harvard University 
 
Published in Social Philosophy and Policy 
Volume 10, Issue 1; January, 1993 
and in Altruism,  
edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Jeffrey Paul, and Fred D. Miller, Jr. 
forthcoming from Cambridge University Press, 1993 
 
 
  To later generations, much of the moral philosophy of the twentieth century 
will  look  like  a  struggle  to  escape  from  utilitarianism.    We  seem  to  succeed  in 
disproving one utilitarian doctrine, only to find ourselves caught in the grip of another.  
I  believe  that  this  is  because  a  basic  feature  of  the  consequentialist  outlook  still 
pervades and distorts our thinking:  the view that the business of morality is to bring 
something about.  Too often, the rest of us have pitched our protests as if we were 
merely  objecting  to  the  utilitarian  account  of  what  the moral  agent  ought  to bring 
about or how he ought to do it.  Deontological considerations have been characterized 
as “side-constraints,” as if they were essentially restrictions on ways to realize ends.
ii  
More importantly, moral philosophers have persistently assumed that the primal scene 
of morality is a scene in which someone does something to or for someone else.  This 
is  the  same  mistake  that  children  make  about  another  primal  scene.    The  primal 
scene of morality, I will argue, is not one in which I do something to you or you do 
something to me, but one in which we do something together.  The subject matter of 
morality is not what we should bring about, but how we should relate to one another.  
If only Rawls has succeeded in escaping utilitarianism, it is because only Rawls has 
fully grasped this point.  His primal scene, the original position, is one in which a group 
of people must make a decision together.  Their task is to find the reasons they can 
share.
iii   In this paper I bring these thoughts to bear on a question which has received 
attention  in  recent  moral  philosophy.    In  contemporary  jargon,  the  question  is 
whether  reasons  and  values  should  be  understood  to  be  agent-relative  or  agent-
neutral, or whether reasons and values of both kinds exist.  In slightly older terms, the 
question  is  whether reasons and values  are subjective,  existing  only in relation  to 
individuals; or objective, there for everyone.  I begin by explaining the distinction in 
more  detail,  and  then  examine  two  kinds  of  examples  which  have  been  used  to 
support the claim that values of both kinds must exist.  By explicating the structure of 
the values in these examples, I hope to show that employing the distinction between 
agent-relative and agent-neutral is not the best way to account for their normative 
force.  Values are neither subjective nor objective, but rather are intersubjective.  They 
supervene on the structure of personal relations. 
iv  
 
I.  Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values 
  In what I have said so far I have assumed an equivalence or at least a direct 
correspondence between values and practical reasons:  to say that there is a practical 
reason for something is to say that the thing is good, and vise versa.  In this I follow 
Thomas Nagel, whose work will be the focus of what I have to say.(VFN 139)
v  Although 
assuming this equivalence gives us a variety of ways to characterize the distinction in 
question, it still turns out to be a delicate matter to do so. 
   According to Nagel, a subjective or agent-relative reason is a reason only for a 
particular agent to promote something;  an objective reason is a reason for anyone to 
promote the thing.
vi  “Subjective” in this context is not meant to suggest “unreal” or 
“illusory.”  Subjective reasons are real and in one sense universal - they are alike for 
everyone - but they are personal property.  Objective reasons, by contrast, are common 
property.  Formally speaking, a subjective reason exists when the formulation of the 
reason contains a “free-agent variable” and an objective reason exists when it does not.(PA 90ff)
vii Thus suppose we say “There is a reason for any agent to promote her 
own  happiness.”  This gives me a reason to promote my happiness and you a reason 
to promote yours, but it does not give you a reason to promote mine or me a reason to 
promote yours.  On the other hand, suppose we say “There is a reason for any agent 
to promote any person’s  happiness.”  This gives each of us a reason to promote not 
only her own happiness but the other’s as well.   
  Formulated  in  terms  of  values,  it  is  tempting  to  say  that  subjective  reasons 
capture the notion of “Good-For”, while objective reasons capture the notion of “Good-
Absolutely”.  If there is a reason for any agent to promote her own  happiness, then my 
happiness is Good-For me and yours is Good-For you.  But if there is a reason for any 
agent to do what will promote any person’s happiness then any person’s happiness is 
Good-Absolutely.    Human  happiness  is  an  objective  value  which  as  such  makes  a 
claim on  all  of us.   This  way  of putting the  point,  however,  obscures an important 
distinction, which I will discuss in the next section.  
  In  The  Possibility  of  Altruism,  Nagel  argued  that  all  subjective  reasons  and 
values  must  be  taken  to  have  objective  correlates.    If  it  is  Good-For  me  to  have 
something, then we must regard it as Good-Absolutely that I should have it.  I cannot 
do  justice  to  Nagel’s  complex  argument  here,  but  its  central  idea  can  easily  be 
conveyed.  Nagel associates a commitment to the objectivity of value with a conception 
of  oneself  as  one  person  among  others  who  are  equally  real.    I  act  on  certain 
considerations which have normative force for me:  they are subjective reasons.  I am 
capable,  however,  of viewing myself from an impersonal point  of view  - as simply a 
person, one among others who are equally real.  When I view myself this way, I still 
regard these considerations as having normative force.
viii  This is especially clear, Nagel 
argues,  when  I  consider  a  situation  in  which  someone  else  fails  to  respond  to  my 
reasons.  This is why we ask “How would you like it if someone did that to you?”  when 
we are trying to get someone to see the normative force of another’s reasons.  If I am tormenting  someone,  say  a  stranger,  the  question  invites  me  to  consider  the  case 
where a stranger is tormenting me.   According to Nagel I should see that I would not 
merely  dislike  this,  I  would  also  resent  it,  and  my  resentment  carries  with  it  the 
thought that my tormentor would have a reason to stop.  That reason is the same as 
my reason for wanting it to stop:  that I don’t like it.  I would expect my tormentor to 
respond  to  my reason.(PA 82-85)  And yet, to  a stranger, I am just a person, some 
person or other.  This shows that I view my reasons as having normative force simply 
insofar as they are a person’s reasons, and expect others to do so as well.  And that 
commits me  to  the  view  that  other people’s reasons  have  normative force for me.
ix  
Where  there  is  a subjective reason, then,  there  is  also  an  objective  one, to  which 
everyone should respond. 
  Later Nagel changed his mind about this conclusion.  But before considering 
that we must ask more exactly what this argument, if it works, establishes. 
 
II.  Two Interpretations of Agent-Neutral Value 
  Earlier I mentioned that there is a problem with understanding the distinction 
between relative and neutral values in terms of the distinction between Good-For and 
Good-Absolutely.    The  problem  is  that  the  claim  that  something  is  a  reason  for 
everyone may be understood in two different ways, one of which the phrase “Good-
Absolutely” tends to conceal.   
  An agent-neutral value might be a value that is independent of what agents 
actually value.  According to this interpretation, the goodness of, say, my happiness, 
has what G.E. Moore called an intrinsic value, a property that is independent either of 
my interest in promoting it or yours.
x  It provides a reason for both of us the way the 
sun provides light for both of us:  because it’s out there, shining down.  And just as the 
sun would exist in a world devoid of creatures who see and respond to light, so values 
would exist in world devoid of creatures who see and respond to reasons.  I call this interpretation  of  agent-neutral  values  Objective  Realism.
xi    On  a  less  metaphysical 
view, agent-neutrality does not mean independence of agents as such, but neutrality 
with  respect  to  the  individual  identities  of  agents.    On  this  reading  values  are 
intersubjective:    they  exist  for  all  rational  agents,  but  would  not  exist  in  a  world 
without them.  I call this view of agent-neutral values Intersubjectivism.
xii   
  The difference between these two interpretations of neutral value is naturally 
associated  with  two  other  differences.    First,  the  two  views  will  normally  involve  a 
different  priority-ordering  between  subjective  or  relative  and  objective  or  neutral 
values.  According to  Objective Realism, subjective values are derived  from objective 
ones:   an  individual comes to value  something by perceiving that  it  has (objective) 
value.    Our  relation  to  values,  on  this  account,  is  epistemological,  a  relation  of 
discovery or perception.  According to Intersubjectivism, objective values are derived or 
-  better  -  constructed  from  subjective  ones.    Our  individual,  subjective  interests 
become  intersubjective  values  when, because  of the  attitude  we  take  towards  one 
another, we come to share each other’s ends.
xiii  On this view, our relation to values is 
one  of  creation  or  construction.    The  second  and  related  difference  concerns  the 
possibility  of adding  and subtracting value  across the  boundaries between  persons.  
On an Intersubjectivist interpretation, neutral reasons are shared, but they are always 
initially subjective or agent-relative reasons.  So on this view, everything that is good 
or  bad  is  so  because  it  is  good  or  bad  for  someone.    This  makes  it  natural  for  an 
Intersubjectivist  to  deny  that  values  can  be  added  across  the  boundaries  between 
people.  My happiness is good for me and yours is good for you, but the sum of these 
two values is not good for anyone, and so the Intersubjectivist will deny that the sum, 
as such, is a value.
xiv  But an Objective Realist, who thinks that the value is in the 
object rather than in its relation to the subject, may think that we can add.   Two 
people’s  happinesses,  both  good  in  themselves,  will  be  better  than  one.    Since 
consequentialism  depends  upon  the  possibility  that  values  may  be  added,  an Objective realist about value may be a consequentialist, while an Intersubjectivist will 
not.
xv   
  This leaves us with some important questions.  We shall want to know how 
Intersubjectivism could be true, and what there is to choose between it and Objective 
Realism.  These are questions to which I will return in due course.  More immediately, 
I want to raise a question about Nagel.  Which kind of agent-neutral values did he 
intend to defend?  This turns out to be a little difficult to establish.  In a “Postscript” 
he later attached to The Possibility of Altruism, Nagel says: 
This book defends the claim that only objective reasons are acceptable, 
and that subjective reasons are legitimate  only if they can be derived 
from objective ones.  I now think that the argument actually establishes 
a different conclusion:  That there are objective reasons corresponding 
to all subjective  ones.  It remains possible that the original  subjective 
reasons  from  which  the others are  generated retain some independent 
force  and  are  not  completely  subsumed  under  them.  (PA  vii;  my 
emphases) 
The first part of this is misleading, since nothing in The Possibility of Altruism really 
requires that subjective reasons be “derived from” objective ones.  What the argument 
establishes  (if  it  works)  is  that  if  you  are  to  act  in  harmony  with  a  conception  of 
yourself as one person among others who are equally real, then you must regard your 
own  and  others’ subjective reasons  and values as being  objective  as  well.   This  is 
consistent with the view that the objective values are constructed from - or as Nagel 
himself says here “generated from” - the subjective ones, and so consistent with an 
Intersubjectivist interpretation.   
  In  The  View  from  Nowhere, Nagel  says  his  project  is  to  bring  the  method  of 
objectivity to bear on the will.(VFN 4,138)  You are first to see to what  extent your 
motives are really reasons, with normative force for you, by seeing to what extent they may be confirmed or corrected when you view yourself more objectively, as simply a 
person, one person among others.   You are then to see whether these agent-relative 
reasons  can  support  a  still  more  objective  normative  force,  by considering  whether 
from this point of view they could to taken to have normative force for everyone.  This 
could describe a practical project:  the project would be to bring our subjective motives 
into the impersonal point of view, conferring objective normative force or value upon 
them as far as that can consistently be done.  The result would be Intersubjectivism, 
and sometimes Nagel sounds as if this is what he has in mind.  But at other times he 
seems to think of it as an  epistemological project, one  of discovering whether what 
seems  to  us,  subjectively,  to  be  reasons  are  objectively  real.    He  suggests  that  we 
should take reasons to be objectively real if (or to the extent that) the best account of 
why it seems to us that there are reasons and values is that they are really there.(VFN 
141)  This sounds a form of Objective Realism, not about Platonic entities of some sort, 
but  about  reasons  themselves.    But  it  is  not  perfectly  clear  what  Nagel  thinks  is 
involved  in  the  existence  of  a  reason.
xvi  He  says  that  the  existence  of  reasons  is 
dependent on the existence of creatures who can see and respond to reasons:   
The reasons are real, they are not just appearances.  To be sure, they 
will  be  attributed  only  to  a  being  that  has,  in  addition  to  desires,  a 
general  capacity  to  develop  an  objective  view  of  what  it  should  do.  
Thus, if cockroaches cannot think about what they should do, there is 
nothing they should do.(VFN 150) 
This, however, is in tension with the claims Nagel makes when he is arguing for the 
existence of neutral values.  For instance: 
The  pain  can  be  detached  in  thought  from  the  fact  that  it  is  mine 
without losing any of its dreadfulness.  It has, so to speak, a life of its 
own.  That is why it is natural to ascribe to it a value of its own.(VFN 
160) … suffering is a bad thing, period, and not just for the sufferer.(VFN 161) 
An Intersubjectivist account of neutral values does not require that suffering be a bad 
thing in itself and not just for the sufferer.  It requires only that suffering be a bad 
thing for everyone because it is bad for the sufferer.  So here Nagel again seems to be 
an Objective Realist.  But on a Realist conception of the badness of pain, surely the 
pains of animals who cannot think objectively about what they should do must be bad 
in the same way as the pain of animals who can.  If so, there would be reasons and 
values, even in a world without creatures who can see and respond to them.
xvii  
  Finally, when  discussing the  temptation  to  think  that  a maximally  objective 
account of values must be the best one, Nagel remarks: 
This idea underlies the fairly common moral assumption that the only 
real values are impersonal values, and that someone can really have a 
reason to do something only if there is an agent-neutral reason for it to 
happen.  That is the essence of traditional forms of consequentialism:  
the only reason for anyone to do anything is that it would be better in 
itself, considering the world as a whole, if he did it.(VFN 162-163) 
Evidently  Nagel  thinks  that  the  position  that  there  are  only  agent-neutral  values 
commits one to consequentialism.  Relatedly, he thinks that agent-neutral values are 
correctly described as reasons for things to happen, reasons that are concerned with 
what is “better in itself.”  This again suggests Objective Realism.  Nagel’s position, I 
think, is not fully consistent.   On the whole it seems as if  he takes himself defending 
the  existence  of agent-neutral reasons in an Objective Realist sense, although his 
project can be understood as an Intersubjectivist one. 
  It is not necessary to settle the question of how to categorize Nagel’s position 
here.  But two points are important to the rest of my argument.  First, if we distinguish 
between  agent-relative  or  subjective  values  on  the  one  hand,  and  agent-neutral 
values  understood  on  the  Objective  Realist  model    on  the  other,  we  leave  out  an important option.  Values may be intersubjective:  not part of the fabric of the universe 
or external truth, but nevertheless shared or at least shareable by agents.
xviii  Second, 
if the status of values is essentially Intersubjective, then the question arises why we 
should suppose that a value must be shared by everyone, why Intersubjectivism must 
be  universal.    If  values  arise  from  human  relations,  then  there  are  surely  more 
possibilities.  The claims springing from an acknowledgement of our common humanity 
are  one  source  of value, but the claims springing from friendships, marriages, local 
communities and common interests may be others.   
   
III.  Why Not All Values are Agent-Neutral 
  By the time he wrote The View From Nowhere  Nagel had decided that not all 
subjective values have objective correlates.
xix  He argues that an individual may have 
agent-relative or subjective reasons which have a legitimate normative force for her 
but which have no normative force for others.   
  Nagel  was  moved  to  modify  his  earlier  position,  I  believe,  by  a  general 
consideration and by reflection on certain familiar categories of value which seem to 
illustrate  that  consideration.    The  general  consideration  is  familiar  to  us  from 
criticisms  of  utilitarianism,  especially  those  of  Bernard  Williams.
xx    According  to 
Williams,  utilitarianism  deprives  the  moral  agent  of  her  integrity  or  individual 
character, because it does not allow her actions to be guided by commitments to a set 
of  people  and  projects  that  are  her  distinctively  her  own.    But  these  are  the  very 
commitments which make us who we are as individuals and give us reasons for caring 
about our own lives.   A person may surely find that some project or person is the most 
important  thing  in  the  world  to  her  without  having  to  suppose  that  it  is  the  most 
important thing in the world absolutely.   A theory that requires impartial allegiance to 
a system of agent-neutral values gives individuals insufficient space in which to lead their  own  lives.    In  Samuel  Scheffler’s  words,  it  ignores  “the  independence  and 
distinctness of the personal point of view.”
xxi 
  In The View from Nowhere  Nagel discusses three categories of values which, he 
thinks must be understood as agent-relative for these reasons.(VFN 164ff.)  The first 
category springs from the agent’s special relationship to his own projects.  Nagel calls 
these “reasons of autonomy.”   He gives the example of someone with a desire to climb 
to  the  top  of Kilimanjaro.   This desire,  he  supposes, could give  the  person  a good 
reason to make the climb, without giving others a reason to help him to make it.(VFN 
167) Because  he  has the desire, his climbing Kilimanjaro is Good-For him, but this 
does not make it Good-Absolutely, nor need he suppose that it does.   The second 
category,  and  the  most  difficult  to  understand,  is  the  category  of  “deontological 
reasons.”    These  are  traditional  moral  restrictions,  which  forbid  performing  certain 
types  of  actions  even  when  the  consequences  of  doing  so  are  good.    According  to 
Nagel, they spring from an agent’s special relationship to his own actions.  Although it 
may be best absolutely that someone should lie or break faith or kill another, because 
of the good consequences that will in this way be produced, it may be better for him 
not to do so.(VFN 180) The last category is “reasons of obligation” which, Nagel says, 
“stem  from  the  special  obligations  we  have  toward  those  to  whom  we  are  closely 
related:  parents, children, spouses, siblings, fellow members of a community or even a 
nation.”(VFN 165)  Because of my special obligation to my own child, for instance, it 
might be the most important thing in the world to me that my child be successful or 
happy.  I can  have  this attitude  without supposing that my child is  objectively any 
more important than any other child.   
  In each of these three cases, it appears as if an agent has excellent subjective 
reasons for doing things which from an objective point of view are either completely 
worthless or obviously inferior to other things which she might do.  Of course there are 
familiar  strategies  for  dealing  with  these  appearances,  many  of  which  have  been generated by the utilitarian tradition.   The most revisionist is to dismiss them, and 
castigate people who spend their time on worthless activities as irrational and people 
who pursue the happiness of their loved ones at the expense of the greater good as 
selfish.  A more moderate strategy is to produce  extraneous justifications for giving 
one’s  personal  concerns  extra  weight.    The  good  is  maximized,  say,  by  everyone 
looking after  her  own special friends.  But there  are  also  well-known  objections to 
these  strategies.
xxii    Rather  than  supposing  that  a  special  concern  for  your  own 
projects,  loved  ones,  and  actions  is  either  irrational  or  in  need  of  an  extraneous 
justification,  Nagel  thinks  we  should  allow  that  there  are  some  values  which  are 
purely agent-relative. Accordingly, in The View from Nowhere, he offers us explanations 
of why reasons of the first two kinds, reasons of autonomy and deontological reasons, 
might be thought to exist.  In what follows I examine these accounts.  
   
IV.  Ambition 
  In The View from Nowhere, Nagel suggests that some of an agent’s interests and 
desires give rise to agent-neutral values and some only to agent-relative values.  The 
obvious question is how we are to draw the line.  Nagel expects the two categories to 
sort along these lines:  our interests in avoiding pains and having pleasures, in the 
satisfaction  of what we  would intuitively call basic  needs, and in the possession of 
freedom, self-respect, and access to opportunities and resources give rise to neutral 
values.(VFN 171) But more idiosyncratic personal projects, such as the desire to climb 
to  the  top  of  Kilimanjaro  or  to  learn  to  play  the  piano,  have  only  relative  value.   
Rather  than  using  Nagel’s  label  “reasons  of  autonomy,”    I  am  going  to  call  these 
idiosyncratic projects “ambitions.”
xxiii The claim is that ambitions give those who have 
them reasons to do things, but do not give others reasons to help or to care whether 
these things get done.  The question then is why the normative force of ambitions is 
limited in this way.   According to Nagel, it is a matter of how far an individual’s authority to confer 
value may appropriately be thought to extend.(VFN 168)  In order to explain this it is 
helpful to introduce another distinction.  Nagel believes that values may differ in what 
he calls their degree of externality, their independence from the concerns of sentient 
beings.(VFN 152-153)  Some valuable things clearly get their value from their relation 
to  people.    Consider  for  instance  chocolate.  We  could  account  for  the  value  of 
chocolate  in  either  of  two  ways.   One  is  to say that  its value  is  intrinsic,  and  the 
reason why we like it so much is because we recognize that fact.  If we failed to like 
chocolate, we would have failed to appreciate something of value.  The other is to say 
that eating chocolate is valuable to human beings because we like it so much.  In the 
case of chocolate, that seems like a much more sensible thing to say.  Chocolate is not 
an  independent  value  which  our  taste  buds  recognize  (as  if  they  were  an 
epistemological faculty, a way of knowing about values).  Instead, chocolate gets its 
value from the way it affects us.  We confer value on it by liking it.   
  In other cases it is less obvious whether this sort of analysis applies.  Consider 
the value of a beautiful sunset or a work of art.   Here, people are much more tempted 
to  say  that  the  value,  the  beauty,  is  in  the  object  itself,  and  that  what  we  do  is 
recognize it.  If we didn’t like it, we would be failing to see a value that is really there.  
This is the kind of value that Nagel calls external.
xxiv  Obviously, this kind of value is 
only  possible  if  we  accept  an  Objective  Realist  interpretation  of  agent-neutral  or 
objective values.  An Intersubjectivist must say that the value of beauty arises in the 
same  way  as  value  of  chocolate,  only  by  a  more  complex  process.      In  this  case, 
æsthetic value would  also be a value that we confer.
xxv 
  Leave aside the question whether there are any external values.  Suppose that 
we  are  talking  about  those  values  which  we  confer.    Some  of  these  values  are 
conferred collectively  -  as æsthetics values are, if they are conferred  - while others 
are  conferred  individually.    This  is  the  phenomenon  which  Nagel  refers  to  as  the individual’s authority.  The individual’s authority is his right to confer objective value 
on something by desiring or enjoying or being interested in it.   Whenever we say that 
an agent-neutral value arises from someone’s desire, we in effect allow the agent to 
confer agent-neutral or objective value on some state of affairs.  If all desires gave rise 
to agent-neutral reasons, every desire would be an act of legislation - it would create a 
value for the whole human race.  The question therefore is how far the individual’s 
right to legislate runs:  what range of things an individual has the authority to confer 
neutral or objective value on.  
   Nagel  believes  that  it  is  appropriate  to  give  the  individual  the  authority  to 
confer  objective  value  on  her  own  inner  states  and  the  conditions  that  determine 
what living her life is like, but that it is not appropriate to give an agent the authority 
to confer objective value on things that are completely outside of herself.(VFN 169-171)  
Suppose, for example, that it is my ambition that my statue should stand on campus.  
It seems very odd to say that everyone has a reason to work to bring this about merely 
because I desire it.  Why should  I be the right person to determine what state of the 
campus  is  objectively  good?
xxvi    On  the  other  hand,  I  seem  to  be  exactly  the  right 
person  to determine  what state  of  me is  objectively good.  If I’m not the person  to 
determine this, who could possibly be?  This is why everyone has a reason to help me 
to achieve things like pleasure and freedom, but no one has a reason to help me get 
my statue put up on campus. 
  Two facts complicate what I have just said, which we must notice in order to 
avoid confusion.  The first is that the satisfaction of a desire often brings pleasure, and 
Nagel  supposes  that  pleasure  has  neutral  value.    So  in  one  sense  you  do  have  a 
reason to help me arrange to get my statue on campus, but it is not, directly, that I 
want it.  It is that, given that I want it, it will give me pleasure.  To see that these two 
reasons are different, we need only remind ourselves that desire and pleasure can be 
prized apart. We can have desires for the realization of states of affairs in which we will not personally take  part, and desires  whose  satisfactions  we  will  never  even  know 
about.   
  The  other complication comes from one  of Nagel’s other categories of agent-
relative reasons.  It seems natural to believe that people have a special obligation to 
try to promote the projects of those with whom they have personal relationships.(VFN 
168)  If I am your friend, I should be concerned with whether or not you achieve your 
ambitions,  regardless  of  whether  your  doing  so  serves  some  objective  or  neutral 
value.
xxvii  To correct for these complications, we should imagine a case where all that 
is relevant is that some randomly selected person has an ambition, and ask whether 
that ambition, in itself, provides others with normative reasons, as it does the person 
who has it.  Suppose I want my statue to stand on campus after I am dead.(VFN 169)  I 
will not be one of those who uses or even sees the campus, nor will I even be around 
to enjoy the thought that my ambition has been achieved.  Someone who takes this 
desire to be in itself the source of an objectively normative reason must be prepared to 
let  me  control  campus  æsthetics  from  beyond  the  grave.      According  to  Nagel,  my 
authority should not extend so far.   
  This way of putting the question makes Nagel’s answer seem reasonable.  But 
it ignores the fact that most people do not regard the value of pursuing their ambitions 
as grounded merely in their own desires.
xxviii  Here it helps to appeal to a distinction 
Nagel himself used in The Possibility of Altruism - the distinction between unmotivated 
and motivated desires. (PA 29ff). An unmotivated desire is one which is simply caused 
in  us; a motivated desire is  one  for  which  we  can give reasons.  In The  View  from 
Nowhere, Nagel says nothing about why his exemplar wants to play the piano or climb 
to  the  top  of  Kilimanjaro.(VFN  167)      But  most  people  do  have  reasons  for  their 
personal ambitions, and in this sense their ambitions are motivated.
xxix  Attention to 
this fact reveals that the structure of a reason of ambition is rather complex.      Suppose  it  is  my  ambition  to  write  a  book  about  Kant’s  ethics  that  will  be 
required reading in all ethics classes.  I do not care whether or not I live to see my 
book  required.    Following  Nagel’s  analysis  we  will  say  that  this  ambition  is  agent-
relative, since it gives me a reason to try to bring it about that my book is required 
reading, but it doesn’t give anyone else a reason to require my book.  This seems to fit, 
for surely no reason for anyone to require my book could spring from the bare fact that 
I want it that way.  The only conceivable reason for anyone to require my book would 
be that it was a good book.     
  But this way of describing the situation implies a strange description of my own 
attitude.   It suggests that my desire  to  have  my book required  is  a product  of raw 
vanity, and that if I want to write a good book, this is merely as a means to getting it 
required.   This does not correctly reflect the structure of my ambition.  Part of the 
reason that I want to write a good book on Kant’s ethics is that I think that such a 
book would be a good thing, and my ambition is not conceivable without that thought.  
It  is  an  ambition  to  do  something  good,  and  it  would  not  be  served  by  people’s 
requiring my book regardless of whether it was good.  For now, let us describe this by 
saying that I think someone should write a book on Kant’s ethics good enough that it 
will be required reading.  I think that this would have neutral value. 
  This doesn’t, however, mean that my ambition is just a disinterested response 
to that neutral value.  It is essential not to sanitize the phenomena here, or we shall 
go wrong.  I may be interested in personal adulation, I may really like the idea of my 
book’s  being  required  reading,  and  I may  even  harbor  competitive  feelings  towards 
other engaged in similar projects.  I don’t just want it to be the case that someone 
writes the book.  I want to be the someone who writes that book.  That element in my 
ambition is ineliminably agent-relative; no one else, except possibly my friends, has a 
reason to care whether I write the book or someone else does.  
  So the structure of this ambition is not:   i) I want my book to be required reading  (where that’s an agent-relative end) 
  ii) therefore:   I shall write a good book  (as a means to that end) 
but rather: 
  i) Someone should write a book on Kant good enough that it will be required 
reading.    (where that’s an agent-neutral end) 
  ii) I want to be that someone (agent-relative motive)  
In other words, to have a personal  project or ambition is not to desire a special object 
which you think is good for you subjectively, but rather to want to stand in a special 
relationship to something you think is good objectively.   
  Ambition so characterized clearly does have an agent-relative component:  you 
want to stand in a special relationship to what is good.   Is this component the source 
of  subjective  normative  reasons  for  action?      On  the  one  hand,  the  agent-relative 
component does seem to motivate me to do a lot of work I would not otherwise do.  It is 
often true that without the personal element in ambition, people would not be able to 
bring themselves to carry out arduous tasks.  There are therefore neutral reasons for 
encouraging the personal desires associated with ambitions.  But should the agent 
herself treat these personal desires as the sources of reasons?  If I took it seriously 
that my desire that I  should be the one to write the book was a reason for action, 
then I would have a reason to prevent one of the other Kant scholars from writing her 
book.  But in fact, neither I nor anybody else thinks I have a reason to do this, even if 
in competitive moments I am tempted to feel it.  This is not an expression of ambition, 
but rather a very familiar perversion of it.    
  It is important to see that reasons of personal obligation almost always have 
this  form.    Although  I  may  not  suppose  that  the  happiness  of  my  loved  ones  is 
objectively more important than that of anyone else, I certainly do suppose that their 
happiness is objectively good.  The structure of reasons arising from love is similar to 
that of reasons of ambition.  I think that someone should make my darling happy, and I want very much to be that someone.  And others may have good reason to encourage 
me in this.  But if I try to prevent someone else from making my darling happy or if I 
suppose that my darling’s happiness has no value unless it is produced by me, that is 
no longer an expression of love. Again, it is a very familiar perversion of it.
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  Where  there  is  no  agent-neutral  value  anywhere  in  the  structure  of  the 
ambition - where the ambition is not an ambition to do something good - we might feel 
inclined to deny that it provides any kind of a reason, even an agent-relative reason 
for its agent.  This is a plausible way of dealing with my ambition to have my statue on 
campus.   That is just a stupid piece of vanity, and one might well think that such a 
desire doesn’t provide even me with a reason for trying to arrange its satisfaction.   
  But there is an important objection to the way I have handled these cases.  I 
have  been  trading  on  the  claim  that  a  good  book  on  Kant’s  ethics  would  be  an 
objectively good thing.  You may of course deny that.  But even if you accept it,  you 
might point out that not every ambition is in that way an ambition to do or produce 
something good.  Is someone who wants to climb a mountain “because it is there” 
committed to the view that someone  ought to climb this mountain (as if it  needed 
climbing) or perhaps that climbing a mountain an intrinsically valuable action, whose 
occurrence everyone has a reason to promote?  Does someone who wishes to collect 
stamps or coins or barbed wire, or to excel at bowling or billiards, have to believe that 
these are activities with an intrinsic value of their own? 
  Perhaps that does not seem quite right.   But neither does it seem right to say 
that those who pursue such projects are in the grip of unmotivated desires, or view 
themselves  as being so.   There  are reasons for caring about  these  things, reasons 
which are communicable and therefore at least potentially shareable.  Ask a mountain 
climber why she climbs and she need not be mute:  she may tell you things about the 
enlarged vistas, the struggle with the elements, the challenge of overcoming fears or 
surpassing  physical  limitations.    She  takes  her  desire  to  climb  mountains  to  be  a motivated  desire,  motivated  by  recognizably  good  features  of  the  experience  of 
climbing.  She does not take the value of the climb to be conferred on it simply by her 
desire to do it.  Someone who says “I just want to” isn’t offering you his reason; he is 
setting up a bulwark against incomprehension.  You may be the problem or he may 
feel himself inarticulate:  many people do.  But listen to the articulate talk about their 
projects  and  you  hear  the  familiar  voice  of  humanity,  not  the  voice  of  alien 
idiosyncrasies.   
  Or if you don’t, perhaps you should.  For it is at this point that the difference 
between  Objective Realism and Intersubjectivism becomes important.  An  Objective 
Realist interpretation of the value  of climbing mountains, or of collecting stamps or 
coins  or barbed  wire,  or  of  excelling  at bowling or billiards, is  not very tempting.
xxxi  
Neither, as I think, is an Objective Realist interpretation of the value of a good book on 
Kant’s ethics.  These  are not intrinsic values, already there in the universe, which we 
have discovered, but rather are expressions of our own distinctively human capacity to 
take an interest, and to find something interesting, in whatever we find around us.  To 
share another’s ends, or at least to grant that they could be shared, is to see them as 
expressions  of that capacity, and so  as  expressions  of  our common  humanity.  The 
Intersubjectivist sees the other as human, and therefore  shares or tries to share the 
other’s  ends.    That  is  why  she  helps  others  to  pursue  their  ambitions.    But  the 
Objective Realist sees no reason to help unless he first sees the other’s ends as ones 
that he can share.  His relationship to others is mediated by his relationship to their 
ends.  According to the Intersubjectivist this is not only a mistake in moral theory but 
a moral wrong.  We should promote the ends of others not because we recognize the 
value  of those ends, but rather out of respect for the  humanity of those who  have 
them.   
  I am not here concerned to argue, as Nagel is in The Possibility of Altruism, that 
we are always obliged to promote  everyone’s ambitions, and that therefore we must find some “combinatorial principles” for weighing up the many reasons they provide. 
(PA 133ff.)  I do not myself believe that reasons can be added across the boundaries of 
persons.  And since we cannot always act for everyone’s reasons, that cannot be our 
duty.  But  according to this  argument  we  are  obliged to see  the  ends  of  others  as 
providing reasons for action, and this means that the claims of proximity may bring 
them into play.  Someone in your neighborhood, in immediate need of help in order to 
carry out his ambition, does present you with a reason to act.  In that sense reasons 
springing from ambitions are agent-neutral.  But they spring from our respect for one 
another, rather than from our respect for one another’s ends. 
  But one form of proximity is especially important.   For of course it is also true 
that you might come to share the ambition of another in a deeper way.   For if what I 
have said is right, you ought to be committed to the view that another could explain to 
you what is good about the world as she sees it through the eyes of her ambition.
xxxii  
You may come to see the value of mountain-climbing, or philosophical ethics, or stamp 
collecting, and to take it as your own.  And then, between the two of you, the value 
functions as if it were a value in the Objective Realist sense.   It is a fact about your 
relationship  that  you  both  see  this  as  a  good  thing,  which  you  share  a  reason  to 
promote.  This is why those who share particular ambitions form communities which 
acknowledge  special  and  reciprocal  obligations  to  one  another.    In  this  way, 
Intersubjective values can come to function like Objective Realist values with respect 
to the very communities which they themselves create. 
   
V.  Deontology 
  Deontological reasons are reasons for an agent to do or avoid certain actions.  
They do not spring from the consequences of those actions, but rather from the claims 
of those with whom we interact to be treated by us in certain ways.  One who believes 
in deontological values believes that no matter how good our  ends are, we are  not supposed to hurt people, or tell lies, or break promises in their pursuit.  Deontological 
reasons are the source of the traditional moral thou-shalt-nots. 
  It is important to see why Nagel thinks these reasons must be agent-relative.  
Three  other  accounts  of them,  which construe them  as  objective  or agent-neutral, 
may seem more plausible at first glance.   
  First,  we  might  think  that  they  derive  directly  from  the  agent-neutral  or 
objectively  valuable  interests  of  the  other  people  involved,  the  potential  victims  of 
wrongdoing.  We might think that the reason not to hurt people is that it is objectively 
bad for them to be hurt, or that the reason not to lie to people is that it is objectively 
good for them to know the truth, or that the reason not to break promises springs from 
the  objective  badness  of  disappointed  expectations.  In  short,  we  might  think  that 
wrong-doing is bad because of the specific harm that it does to the victim.  
  The  second  account  of  deontological  values  is  modeled  on  one  utilitarian 
account of them.  John Stuart Mill argued that deontological principles are a kind of 
inductive generalization from particular utility calculations.
xxxiii  We apply the principle 
of  utility  directly  in  a  large  number  of  individual  cases,  and  discover  that,  almost 
always, telling lies or breaking promises does more harm than good.  Usually, this will 
be for the kind of reason mentioned in the first account - say, that pain, ignorance, or 
disappointment is bad - together with certain more long-range considerations, such as 
the bad effects of setting an example or making a habit of doing such actions.
xxxiv  The 
actions are bad because of the general harm which they do. 
  Third, we might think that the actions forbidden by deontological reasons are 
simply bad in themselves, objectively so; not (just) because of the harm that they do 
but because of a specific form of badness, namely wrongness.  
  But there  are  problems  with  all  of these  attempts to construe deontological 
values  as  agent-neutral.    To  see  this  consider  Bernard  Williams’s  by  now  famous 
example: Jim finds himself in the central square of a small South American town. 
Tied up against the wall are a row of twenty Indians, most terrified, a 
few  defiant,  in  front  of  them  several  armed  men  in  uniform.    …The 
captain in charge explains that the Indians are a random group of the 
inhabitants who, after recent acts of protest against the government, 
are just about to be killed to remind other possible protestors of the 
advantages of not protesting.  However, since Jim is an honored visitor 
from another land, the captain is happy to offer him a guest’s privilege of 
killing one of the Indians himself.  If Jim accepts, then as a special mark 
of the occasion, the other Indians will be let off.  …if Jim refuses …Pedro 
here will do what he was about to do when Jim arrived, and kill them 
all.
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Utilitarians are committed to the view that it is obvious that Jim should kill an Indian, 
but  few  people  can  imagine  themselves  in  Jim’s  position  without  some  sense  of  a 
dilemma.  Many think that in Jim’s shoes they would kill an Indian, but they do not 
see it as a happy opportunity for doing some good.  Some think that Jim should not let 
the captain coopt him into participating in a murder and should refuse.  Still others 
think that it is essential to find out, if possible, what the Indians want Jim to do.
xxxvi  
Nagel thinks that if all values are objective or agent-neutral we should have no sense 
of dilemma in cases like this, since that we do the most good by killing the Indian is 
obvious.  
    This problem can be dealt with in various ways.  A consequentialist may claim 
that  it  is  salutary for  us  to  be  subject  to  some  hesitation  to  kill,  even  when  it  is 
irrational.  Someone who favors the second account of deontological reasons, in terms 
of  general  harm,  is  especially  likely  to  make  this  argument:    killing  is  certainly  is 
something that usually does more harm than good, so a natural reluctance to do it has 
a consequentialist value of its own.
xxxvii   Another possible solution is suggested by the fact that the problem seems to depend on the assumption that values can be added 
across the boundaries between persons.  If we deny this assumption, we may deny 
that killing twenty Indians is a worse thing than killing one.  This move is not open to 
those who hold that the badness of a wrong act rests in the general harm that it does.  
But those who think that the badness rests in the specific harm to the victim, or in 
the wrongness of the act itself, may simply refuse to add.  According to this view, not 
only hesitating but refusing to kill the Indian is perfectly intelligible.  
  But  this doesn’t  entirely solve  the  problem.   Suppose  we  do think  that  the 
badness of killing this Indian rests either in his own resulting death or in the badness 
of the act of killing him.  We refuse to add.  Now it looks as if the badness is the same 
whether the Indian is shot by Jim or by Pedro:  there will be a death, and a killing, 
either way.  So perhaps Jim should flip a coin?  This doesn’t seem right either:  most of 
us think that if Jim doesn’t suppose he is going to do any good by killing the Indian 
then he certainly should not kill him.  But if the same amount of evil is done either 
way, then Jim’s reason for declining to kill the Indian must be agent-relative.  
  To make the problem clearer, imagine a peculiar theory of value.  According to 
this theory, value is always objective  or agent-neutral, and the  only thing that has 
value  is  the  keeping  of  promises.    This  theory  will  not  tell  us  always  to  keep  our 
promises, surprising as this may seem.  First, assume that we can add values.  Then 
there could be a case like this:  by breaking your promise, you could cause five other 
people to keep theirs; while, if you keep yours, they will break theirs. You produce 
more promise-keeping by breaking your promise than by keeping it, and so that is what 
the theory tells you to do.   Second, suppose we say that the promise-breakings must 
be bad for someone, and that their badness cannot be added across the boundaries 
between persons.  For whom are they bad?  It doesn’t matter which view we take.  If 
the badness is for the victim, I have no reason to care whether I inflict it on him or you do.  I should flip a coin. If the badness is for me, the agent, I may have a reason to care, 
but it could only be an agent-relative one. 
  Nagel  concludes  that  deontological  reasons,  if  they  exist,  are  agent-relative.  
The special relation in which you stand in to an action when you are the one who 
does it carries a special weight, like the special relations in which you stand in to your 
own ambitions or loved ones.   In taking this position he joins Samuel Scheffler, who 
had  earlier  argued  that  deontological  values  are  agent-relative.    In  his  book,  The 
Rejection of Consequentialism,  Scheffler argues for what he calls an “agent-centered 
prerogative,”  a right,  under certain conditions,  to  neglect  what  will conduce  to  the 
overall good in favor of one’s personal commitments.
xxxviii  Such a prerogative does the 
work  of  Nagel’s  “reasons  of  autonomy.”    But  Scheffler  finds  the  idea  of  an  “agent-
centered restriction” - that is, a deontological requirement - paradoxical.  He claims 
that  the idea that there could be a reason  not to do certain actions which is not 
equally  a  reason  to  prevent  them  from  being  done  has  “an  apparent  air  of 
irrationality,” which any account of them must dispel.
xxxix  Although Nagel undertakes 
to  explain  how  deontological  reasons  arise,  it  is  clear  that  he  shares  Scheffler’s 
attitude.  He characterizes deontological constraints as “obscure” and “peculiar”; he 
wonders how what we do can be so much more important than what happens.(VFN 
175; 180-181)  At one point he says: 
One reason for the resistance to deontological constraints is that they 
are formally puzzling, in a way that the other reasons we have discussed 
are not.  We can understand how autonomous agent-relative reasons 
might derive from the specific projects and concerns of the agent, and 
we can understand how neutral reasons might derive from the interests 
of others, giving each of us reason to take them into account.  But how 
can there be relative reasons to respect the claims of others?  How can there be a reason not to twist someone’s arm which is not  equally a 
reason to prevent his arm from being twisted by someone else? 
(VFN 178) 
Despite his doubts, Nagel gives an account of why they exist.   
  In cases where a deontological restriction is at issue, doing the action puts you 
into a direct relationship with another human being - your “victim” as Nagel puts it.  In 
performing the action, you will have to aim directly at evil for your victim, even if your 
larger purpose is good.   Nozick, in his remarks on the apparent paradox of deontology, 
puts the point in more Kantian language.  In violating a deontological requirement, 
you will have to treat your victim as a mere means.
xl  I will come back to the question 
of what there is to choose between these two formulations.  In any case, the force of 
deontological  restrictions,  according  to  Nagel,  rests  in  the  immediate  badness  of 
victimizing someone.      
  Nagel illustrates his point with an example.(VFN 176) You need the cooperation 
of a reluctant elderly woman in order to save someone’s life, and you find that you can 
only secure it by twisting the arm of her grandchild so that his screams will induce her 
to act.  You are faced with using the child as a means to saving a life, and in this case, 
that involves hurting the child.  If the grandmother doesn’t give in, you have to try and 
hurt the child more.  You have to will to hurt the child more, and so, in a sense to 
want to.(VFN 182)  The louder the child screams, the better for you.  But there he is, a 
child, a vulnerable human being to whom everyone owes protection.  From your point 
of view, this is a terrible thing to do.   
  You might think that this analysis doesn’t apply in some of the other cases I’ve 
mentioned.  Consider  Williams’s Indians.   The  one you kill  is going  to die  anyway, 
whether he is shot by you all alone or along with his compatriots by Pedro.  So you are 
not bringing about an evil for him which he would not have endured otherwise.  But 
there is still a sense in which you are aiming directly at his evil.  You must pick up a rifle, aim it at his heart, and fire.  You must be gratified if the bullet kills him, just as 
you must be gratified if the child screams louder.  And, despite appearances, there is 
also a sense in which you are treating him as a mere means.  You are killing him in 
order to save the others.  The fact that he is going to die anyway doesn’t really change 
the fact that this is what you are doing.   
  According to Kant, you treat someone as a mere means whenever you treat him 
in a way to which  he could not possibly consent.
xli  Kant’s criterion most obviously 
rules out actions which depend upon force, coercion, or deception for their nature, for 
it is of the  essence of such actions that they make it impossible for their victims to 
consent.  If I am forced I have no chance to consent.   If I am deceived I don’t know 
what I am consenting to.  If I am coerced my consent itself is forced by means I would 
reject.
xlii  So if an action depends upon force or deception or coercion it is impossible 
for me to consent to it.  To treat someone as an end, by contrast, is to respect his right 
to  use  his  own  reason  to  determine  whether  and  how  he  will  contribute  to  what 
happens. 
  This is why it is important to establish, if you can, what the Indians themselves 
think should happen.  Suppose the oldest Indian steps forward and says “Please go 
ahead, shoot me, and I forgive you in advance.” This doesn’t make things wonderful 
but it does help. Very roughly speaking, you are not treating him as a mere means if he 
consents to what you are doing.
xliii   Of course the Indian does not in general consent 
to be shot, and his gesture does not mean that after all he has not been wronged.  In 
the larger moral world he has.  But if you and the Indians are forced to regard Pedro 
and the Captain as mere forces of  nature, as in this case you are, then there is a 
smaller moral  world  within  which  the  issue  is between you  and  them, and in  that 
world this Indian consents.  On the other hand, suppose the Indians are pacifists and 
they say “We would rather die than ask you, an innocent man, to commit an act of 
violence.  Don’t do what the captain asks, but go back up north, and tell our story; make sure people know what is happening down here.”  Now the decision not to shoot 
looks much more tempting, doesn’t it?  Now you can at least imagine refusing.  But you 
may still take the rifle from Pedro’s hands and say “You cannot ask me to kill to save 
you, and yet I will” and pick an Indian to shoot.  This is a different kind of decision to 
kill than the earlier one, for it involves a refusal to share the Indians’ moral universe; 
from the perspective of the Indians who live, it has a slight taint of paternalism. 
  Surprisingly, the fact that you are treating someone as a mere means operates 
even in the peculiar cases of breaking a promise so that other people will keep theirs, 
or telling a lie so that others will tell the truth.  You can see this by imaging the kind 
of case in which you could be faced with such a decision.  If I tell the truth, I predict, 
three of you will tell lies that you should not tell.  On what basis could I make this 
prediction? Perhaps I think that if I tell the truth I will reveal information which will 
show you that it is in your interest to lie, and I also think that you are unscrupulous 
people who will lie if it is in your interest.   Or perhaps I believe that the truth will 
confuse you, and that you will tell the lies as a result of the muddle.  Or perhaps I 
think you have a wrongheaded moral system, and knowing this particular truth will 
make you wrongly conclude that you ought to lie.   However it goes, if I tell a lie in 
order  to  get  you to  tell  the  truth, I am treating you  as somehow inferior creatures 
whose tendency to go wrong must be controlled by my superior wisdom.  Since this is a 
way of being treated to which you could not possibly consent, I am treating you as a 
mere means.  Here I am not  necessarily aiming at  anything  evil for you:  I may be 
paternalistic,  protecting  you  from  going  wrong.    This  shows,  I  think,  that  Nagel  is 
mistaken when he emphasizes that you are aiming at your victim’s evil.  The problem 
is that you  are treating your victim as a mere  means.  But suppose  that  with  this 
revision we accept Nagel’s account.  It is the particular badness of treating someone as 
a means that explains deontological reasons.  It is the horribleness of looking right 
into a pair of human eyes, while treating their owner like an piece of furniture or a tool.    And  yet  by  violating  the  restriction  you  may  be  doing  what  is  best.    So  the 
badness of violating it is a badness that is for you.  The reason is agent-relative. 
  Now this doesn’t seem right at all.  Surely when you violate a deontological 
restriction, it is bad for your victim as well as for you.  Your victim may surely object to 
being treated as a mere means, even when he understands the larger good which is 
thereby produced.  And his objection is not only to being harmed; it is to being used.  
Nagel believes that his theory can accommodate the victim’s right to complain.   He 
says:  
The deontological constraint permits a victim always to object to those 
who aim at his harm, and this relation has the same special character of 
normative magnification when seen from the personal perspective of the 
victim that it has when seen from the personal perspective of the agent. 
Such a constraint expresses the direct view of the person on whom he 
is  acting.    It  operates  through  that  relation.    The  victim  feels  outrage 
when he is deliberately harmed even for the greater good of others, not 
simply because of the quantity of the harm but because of the assault 
on  his  value  of  having  my  actions  guided  by  his  evil.(VFN  184;  my 
emphases) 
  This is absolutely right.  But the theory that deontological reasons are agent-
relative  or  only  subjectively  normative  cannot  accommodate  it.   If  the  deontological 
reason were agent-relative, merely my property, my victim would not have the right to 
demand that I act on it.  Consider a comparison.  If you have an agent-relative reason 
to climb Kilimanjaro, and don’t do it, I may entertain the thought that  you are being 
irrational.   I can see what your reasons are.  But if I have no reason to bring it about 
that you climb Kilimanjaro, as Nagel supposes, then I have no reason to talk you into 
doing it.  I have no reason to do anything about your relative reasons, even to think 
about them, although I may happen to.  I certainly don’t have a reason to complain of your conduct when you don’t act on them, and if I do, you may justifiably tell me that it 
is none of my business.  If deontological reasons were agent-relative, the same thing 
would hold for victims.  My victim could entertain the thought that I have a reason not 
to  treat  him  this  way,  but  that  thought  would  give  him  no  grounds  for  complaint.  
Astonishingly enough, it turns out to be none of his business.  
  Earlier, I mentioned two reasons why you might be moved to do something by 
someone  else’s subjective or relative reasons.  One is to give her the agent-neutral 
good of pleasure.  The other springs from the third category of agent-relative reasons, 
the reasons of personal obligation.  If you stand in a personal relation to someone, you 
may therefore interest yourself in her subjective reasons.  This seems like a natural 
thing to say, and it has weight against the points I have just been making.  Although 
we may resent it when strangers point out to us that we are not doing what we have 
reason to do, we do not resent such reminders from friends, and we do not tell them 
that it is none of their business.   
  Nagel suggests, in the passage quoted above, that the deontological constraint 
“operates  through  the  relation”  between  agent  and  victim.    So  it  is  tempting  to 
suppose that what he has in mind is something like this:  The relationship of agents 
and victims, like that of love or friendship, is a personal relationship.  Perhaps that is 
what gives the victim a stake in the agent’s relative reasons, and so entitles him to 
complain.
xliv   
  But the violation of a deontological constraint always involves an agent and a 
victim,  and  so  if  this  account  is  correct,  deontological  reasons  are  always  shared 
reasons.  They cannot be the personal property of individual agents.   Instead, they 
supervene on the relationships of people who interact with one another.  They are 
intersubjective reasons.   
  In fact, Nagel’s primal scene, the confrontation of agent and victim, shows us 
how agent-neutral reasons are created in personal interaction.   My victim complains;  he says:   “How would you like it if someone did that to you?”  I see not merely that I 
wouldn’t like it, but that I would resent it.  I am treating my victim as a means, and it is 
the  essence  of treating another as a means that his consent is dispensed with.  It 
would be impossible for me to consent to be so treated and so I would have to rebel.  
That is why I would feel resentment.  “How would you like it if someone did that to 
you?” In asking me this question my victim demands that I either cease using him as a 
means,  or  give  up  my  own  claim  not  to  be  so  used  by  others.    But  the  latter  is 
impossible:  one cannot consent to be used as a means.  And so he obligates me  to 
desist, and to treat him instead as an end in himself. 
xlv  This of course is a variant of 
Nagel’s own argument in The Possibility of  Altruism.(PA 82ff)  And as his arguments 
there  show,  my  recognition  that  others  must  be  treated  as  ends  in  themselves 
explains  altruistic  reasons  as  well.    We  resent  those  who  regard  our  plight  with 
indifference, in much the same way that we resent those who use us as means.  
  But  now  we  have  arrived  at  a  picture  of  neutral  or  objective  value  that  is 
different from the one Nagel had intended to give us.  According to this account all  
neutral  reasons  for  action  arise  from  a  category  which  Nagel  had  thought  of  as  a 
source  of  relative  reasons  -  the  category  of  personal  relationships.    But  this  is  no 
special category:  forall human interaction is personal.   It is because or to the extent 
that we regard one another as persons that we acknowledge the force of deontological 
reasons.   As persons, others demand that we treat them in ways to which they can 
consent; as persons, we find we must respond to that demand.  But we also express 
our respect for one another’s humanity by sharing in each other’s ends.  As persons, 
we have a claim on one another’s help when it can readily be given or is desperately 
needed.  It is the status of humanity,  as the source of normative claims, that is the 
source of all value.  The argument, in other words, has brought us back to Kant.  
 
VI.  Postscript    Let me conclude by going back to the thoughts with which I began.  In both The 
Possibility  of  Altruism  and  The  View  from  Nowhere,  Nagel’s  arguments  take  an 
unexpected turn.  In both he starts from recognizably Kantian ideas, working in The 
Possibility of Altruism with motivation derived from a metaphysical conception of the 
person, and in The View  from Nowhere with a two-standpoints account.  And yet in 
both he ends up having to construct elaborate arguments to fend off the conclusion 
that his ideas will lead to utilitarianism.  Why does this happen?  It happens because 
Nagel presupposes that the business of morality is to bring something about.
xlvi  This 
presupposition infects Nagel’s arguments in many ways.  In The Possibility of Altruism, 
Nagel treats all reasons as reasons to promote something.(PA 47ff)   In The View from 
Nowhere, he substitutes the idea of aiming at someone’s evil for that of treating him as 
a means.   Nagel is puzzled by deontology because he finds it odd that we could have 
reasons not to do things which are not equally reasons to prevent those things from 
being  done.(VFN  177)    He  does  not  mention  the  difference  between  preventing  an 
action by asking its agent not to do it or talking him out of it and preventing an action 
by the  use  of force  or tricks.  If you suppose  that  all  that matters is what you are 
bringing about, this is merely a difference in method.  If morality is concerned with the 
character of human relationships, this difference is everything. 
xlvii It is no accident that 
in  order  to  explain  deontology,  Nagel  must  finally  imagine  his  agents  and  victims 
talking  to  each  other.
xlviii    Nagel  is  in  danger  of  ending  up  with  consequentialism 
because that is where he started.  
  For the  view  that  the  business  of  ethics  is to  bring something  about is  the 
legacy  of  utilitarianism,  and,  in  turn,  of  the  scientific  aspirations  of  the  utilitarian 
tradition.    According  to  consequentialist  conceptions  of  ethics,  ethics  is  the  most 
sublime form of technical engineering, the one that tells us how to bring about The 
Good.  The questions that it answers are the questions about what we should do with 
the  world.    These  are  the  questions  we  must  face  when  we  confront  issues  of population  control  or  the  preservation  of  the  environment,  issues  with  which 
utilitarians have been non-accidentally obsessed.  But deontological restrictions pre-
date these global issues, and were already recognized at a time when all we had to do 
with the world was to live in it together.   
  One  way  in  which  you  might  be  tempted  to  describe  the  position  I  have 
defended in this paper leaves the distinction between neutral and relative values in 
place.  It might be thought that I am defending this position:  that persons have agent-
neutral  value;  while  all  other  values  are  agent-relative.    And  then  I  add  that  you 
express your sense of the  neutral value  of others by sharing in their agent-relative 
ends.  This is close to the Kantian position I want to defend, but it is a misleading way 
to put it.  It makes the value of persons a metaphysical reality, perhaps in need of a 
metaphysical defense; and to some minds, it will suggest that people are a good thing, 
and therefore that many people are better than a few.  I do not believe these things. 
  Ask yourself, what is a reason?  It is not just a consideration on which you in 
fact act, but one on which you are supposed to act; it is not just a motive, but rather a 
normative claim, exerting authority over other people and yourself at other times.   To 
say that you have a reason is to say something relational, something which implies the 
existence of another, at least another self.  It announces that you have a claim on 
that other, or acknowledges her claim on you.  For normative claims are not the claims 
of a metaphysical world of values upon us:  they are claims we make on ourselves and 
each other.  It is both the essence of consequentialism and the trouble with it that it 
treats The Good, rather than people, as the source of normative claims.     
  The acknowledgement that another is a person is not exactly a reason to treat 
him in a certain way, but rather something that stands behind the very possibility of 
reasons.      I  cannot  treat  my  own  impulses  to  act  as  reasons,  rather  than  mere 
occurrent  impulses,  without  acknowledging  that  I  at  least  exist  at  other  times.      I 
cannot  treat  them  as  values,  exerting  at  least  a  possible  claim  on  others,  without acknowledging that other persons do indeed exist.  That is the lesson of Nagel’s own 
argument in The Possibility of Altruism.  The title of this paper is a tautology:  the only 
reasons that are possible are the reasons we can share.  
 
                                                 
i  This paper  leaves me with many debts.  It is the result of a number 
of years of teaching Thomas Nagel’s books, and I owe a great deal to my 
students for many helpful comments and pressing challenges.  In the 
fall  of  1990,  when  I  was  developing  my  own  responses  to  Nagel  in 
class,  I benefited  especially from comments by Andrew Livernois and 
David  Sussman;  over  the  course  of  the  last  few  years,  my  ideas  on 
these  topics  have  been  shaped  by  conversations  with  Scott  Kim.  
Arthur  Kuflik read drafts  of  the  material  at  two  different  stages  and 
commented  usefully  and  extensively both  times.      I  received  helpful 
written comments from many people on an earlier draft, among them 
James Dreier, Barbara Herman, Andrews Reath, and Amélie Rorty; and 
benefitted  from  conversations  with  Catherine  Elgin,  Patricia 
Greenspan,  Michael  Hardimon,  and  Samuel  Scheffler.    Two  general 
discussions - at the Social Philosophy and Policy Center conference for 
which  this  paper  was  written,  and  with  Thomas  Scanlon  and  the 
members  of  his  seminar  on  value  theory  in  the  Spring  of  1992  - 
provided me with many useful suggestions and clarifications.   And I 
am sure I have been influenced by Stephen Darwall, who makes many 
of the same points  I do in this paper in Part III of his book Impartial 
Reason (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1983).   But my greatest debt 
here is of course to Thomas Nagel, whose ideas I have found endlessly 
fertile even when I have disagreed.  I thank all of these people.                                                                                                                                               
ii The term is used by Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New 
York: Basic Books, 1974).  I should emphasize that it is the term that I 
am criticizing  here.    Nozick’s  account  of  side-constraints  anticipates 
some of what I will say in this paper about deontological reasons: in 
particular, that they are based on the Kantian notion that people must 
not be treated as means (p. 30), and that they will seem puzzling only 
to someone who assumes that “a moral concern can function only as a 
moral goal.” (p.28)   
iii  John  Rawls,  A  Theory  of  Justice  (Cambridge:    Harvard  University 
Press, 1971).  See especially pp. 139-142. 
iv  This formulation may give rise to the misimpression that I do not 
think that there can be duties to the self, or  that questions of value 
cannot arise for the self.   What I actually think is that the relations 
between  stages  of  a  self  have  many  of  the  same  features  as  the 
relations between separate persons; if stages of the self are to lay each 
other under normative demands, they  too owe each other reasons they 
can share.   But, for reasons indicated in Section IV of this paper, it 
follows  that  the  self  cannot  have  a  reason  it  could  not  in  principle 
share  with  others.    This  gives  the  question  of  the  reasons  we  can 
share with others a certain priority, and that is the focus of this paper.   
Duties to the self do not get an adequate treatment here.   
v In this paper, references  to  Nagel’s works will be inserted into the 
text.    The  abbreviations  used  are:    PA=The  Possibility  of  Altruism 
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1970); and VFN = The View from 
Nowhere (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1986).                                                                                                                                              
vi In The Possibility of Altruism, Nagel uses the terms “subjective” and 
“objective.”  But these terms are awkward  because they are used in so 
many  different  ways.    “Subjective”  may  be  used  in  a  metaphysical 
sense,  to  refer  to  how  things  are  for  someone,  assuming  that  things 
might be different for others.  Or it may be used in an epistemological 
sense,  to  refer  to  how  things  seem  to someone,  assuming  that  things 
might in fact be different than they seem. To avoid confusion, notice 
that in this  sense  the  subjective need not be personal or individual.  
Something could seem the same way to every human being and not be 
how  it is from some more objective point of view.  A mirage, although 
seen  by  everybody,  is  in  this  sense  a  subjective  illusion;  more 
controversially,  one  might  say  that  colors  are  a  feature  of  the 
subjective experience of creatures with color vision.    In The Possibility 
of  Altruism,  Nagel  uses  “subjective”  in  a  metaphysical  sense:    a 
subjective value is one that is Good-For some individual.  In The View 
from Nowhere, however, Nagel uses that term to refer to what seems to 
be a reason.    Here his project is first to assert that it seems to us as 
if  we  had  reasons  and  values  (from  a  subjective  or  personal 
standpoint),  and  then  raise  the  question  whether,  from  a  more 
objective or impersonal standpoint, that reveals itself as an illusion of 
the subjective standpoint or not.(VFN Chapter VIII).    For this reason, 
he borrows Derek Parfit’s terms to cover his earlier distinction.  What 
he  had  called  a  subjective  value  becomes  an  agent-relative  value, 
which is a source of reasons for a particular agent, but not necessarily 
for others.  What he had called an objective value becomes an agent-
neutral  value,  which  is  a  source  of  reasons  for  any  agent.(VFN  152)                                                                                                                                                
Parfit introduces these terms in Reasons and Persons (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 1984), p. 143. 
vii  James Dreier has pointed out to me that in styling my project an 
attack  on  the  distinction  between  relative/subjective  and 
neutral/objective I might give the impression that I think this logical 
distinction is not exhaustive, which it obviously is.  My quarrel, as will 
emerge,  is really with Nagel’s account of the source of these reasons, 
which suggests that values and reasons either originate from personal, 
idiosyncratic desires or metaphysical realities of some kind.  I thank 
Dreier for the point.   
viii More accurately,  Nagel’s view  is  that  if  I do not  I will  suffer  from 
dissociation between the personal and impersonal views I can take of 
myself.(PA Chapter XI) 
ix  Or, as one might put it, that every person, being equally real, is a 
source of value.  But Nagel does not put it that way:  he moves, as we 
shall see, from a focus on the (equal) reality of people to a focus on the 
reality of their reasons.  In one sense, I believe his mistake lies here, 
and that he would have arrived at a more Kantian and, as I think, more 
correct position if he had not made this move.  
x  See  especially  G.E.  Moore,  “The  Conception  of  Intrinsic  Value”  in 
Philosophical Studies (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922).   Values could 
still be  independent  of agents  in  this  sense  and  still always  involve 
agents in another sense:  agents and their experiences might always 
be parts of the complex “organic unities” which G.E. Moore think are 
the loci of value.   See note 25.   I  thank Arthur Kuflik for prompting 
me to be clearer about this.                                                                                                                                                
xi Another view makes Good-For-ness objective in this sense.  It is a 
fact about the universe that a certain thing is good for me or for you.  I 
think that this is  the view that G.E. Moore, from whom I borrow the 
idea  of  formulating  these  notions  in  terms  of  Good-For  and  Good-
Absolutely,    found  incoherent.    (See  Principia  Ethica  (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1903), pp. 97ff).   I do not know whether it 
is incoherent, but it is not tempting.   
xii    For  another  account  of  Intersubjectivism  see  Stephen  Darwall, 
Impartial Reason (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1983), Part III. 
xiii   It may help to give examples of the sort of position I have in mind 
here. I am thinking, as will become clear, of Kant’s claim that respect 
for the humanity in the person of another requires you to  share his 
ends; or of Hume’s view that the virtues get their value from a shared 
evaluative  standpoint.    According  to  Kant’s  argument,  a  person’s 
subjective  ends  become  objective  ends  in  the  eyes  of  those  who 
respect  his  humanity;  according  to  Hume’s,  the  character  traits 
subjectively valued by the members of a person’s own “narrow circle” 
become  objectively  valued  when  viewed  from  a  general  point  of  view 
which we share.  As I suggest below in the text, one may read Nagel’s 
projects as forms of Intersubjectivist constructivism as well.  I do not 
know  whether  an  Intersubjectivist  position  must  be  one  in  which 
objective  values  are  constructed  from  subjective  ones,  but  the 
Intersubjectivist positions with which I am familiar do take this form. 
xiv    This  is  not  to  say  that  there  cannot  be  values  that  are  best 
understood  as  “good  for  us.”    But  these  will  not  be  the  results  of 
addition.  They will exist when the two of us stand in a relationship to                                                                                                                                              
which the value in question is relevant.  In this way the birth of a child 
might be good for a couple, or the conclusion of a treaty might be good 
for a nation.  These are collective, not aggregative, goods.   
xv Obviously the array of logically possible positions goes far beyond the 
two  that  are  schematically  described  in  the  text.    One  could  be  an 
Intersubjectivist  and  yet  think  that  values  can  be  added  across  the 
boundaries of persons.  One could be an Objective Realist and yet deny 
that values can be added - not only across the boundaries of people, 
but at all.  In Reasons and Persons  (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
1984), for example, Derek Parfit explores the possibility that weighing 
and compensation cannot take place even within the boundaries of a 
life. (pp. 342-345)  I am not concerned to discuss all possible theories 
of neutral value, but only the two I find most natural.  I shall assume 
throughout this paper that if there is any objection to adding values, it 
comes  from  the  consideration  that  everything  that  is  good  or bad  is 
good  or  bad  for  somebody,  and  that  values  can  be  added  within 
individual lives.  I shall also assume that the view that everything that 
is good or bad is good or bad for someone is most naturally associated 
with some form of intersubjectivism.  
xvi  Sometimes, Nagel seems to imply that all it amounts to for a reason 
to  be  “really  there”  is  that  it  can  be  assimilated  to  the  objective 
standpoint  without  contradiction  or  incoherence.    This  unites  the 
practical  and  the  epistemological  projects  described  in  the  text,  and 
the  result  would  be  an  Intersubjectivist  form  of  realism.    Nagel’s 
values would be part of reality because we put them there, rather the 
way that, according to Kant, causes are part of empirical reality.  This                                                                                                                                              
view would have the merit of giving us realism without metaphysics.  
But  it  would  require  a  transcendental  argument  for  the  category  of 
objective value, and I do not myself see how, in the absence of Kant’s 
own firm division between theoretical and practical reason, this is to 
be achieved. 
xvii Nagel might reply that all that follows is that, if we exist, we have 
reason to stop the animal’s pain.  But if pain has a value of its own it 
seems  more  natural  to  say  that  there  just  is  a  reason  to  stop  the 
animal’s pain, although the animal cannot see and respond to it. 
xviii  One reason that I take this option to be important is this:  I think 
that  its  lack  of  ontological  or  metaphysical  commitments  is  a  clear 
advantage  of  Intersubjectivism;  we  should  not  be  Objective  Realists  
unless, so to speak, there is no other way.  This is not just because of 
Ockham’s  razor.      A  conviction  that  there  are  metaphysical  truths 
backing  up  our  claims  of  value  must  rest  on,  and  therefore  cannot 
explain,  our  confidence  in  our  claims  of  value.    Metaphysical  moral 
realism takes us the long way around to end up where we started - at 
our own deep conviction that our values are not groundless  - without 
giving  us  what  we  wanted  -  some  account  of  the  source  of  that 
conviction.   
xix Nagel backed off from his earlier position by degrees.   At the time he 
added the Postscript to The Possibility of Altruism (quoted on p. 000), he 
had decided that it was possible that an individual’s subjective reasons 
may  sometimes  have  a  legitimate  normative  force  for  her  that  goes 
beyond  that  of  their  objective  correlates.    If  my  happiness  is  Good 
Absolutely we both have a reason to pursue it, but perhaps I find an                                                                                                                                              
additional or a stronger reason in the fact that it is Good-For me.  This 
seems  to  be  an  intermediate  position  between  the  views  of  The 
Possibility of Altruism  and The View from Nowhere . 
xx See J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism For and Against 
(Cambridge:    Cambridge  University  Press,  1973),  pp.  100ff.;  and 
Williams,  Moral  Luck (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1981),  
pp. 1-19.  
xxi    See  Samuel  Scheffler,  The  Rejection  of  Consequentialism,  (Oxford:  
Oxford  University  Press,  1982.)    p.    41.    I  discuss  Scheffler’s  views 
briefly below, pp. 000-000. 
xxii Many of which can be found in the two pieces by Williams cited in 
note 20. 
xxiii  Several readers have pointed  out  to  me  that  this  label,  together 
with the example I go on to discuss, might suggest that all personal 
projects are in some way competitive.  I do not mean to imply that, and 
in fact discuss some non-competitive ones below.  But the choice of an 
example of a personal project which is competitive seems to me to be 
useful, since such projects are especially resistant to objectification of 
either an Objective Realist or an Intersubjectivist kind. 
xxiv  Barbara Herman has pointed out to me that the external account 
works  better  for  natural  beauty  than  for  art,  since  works  of  art  are 
socially embedded and therefore their value seems more relative to our 
interests. 
xxv One may wonder whether an Objective Realist can accommodate the 
cases of clearly relational value, like the case of chocolate.  The answer 
is yes.  The Objective Realist doesn’t have to place the intrinsic value                                                                                                                                              
in the chocolate.  He can place it in the experience of a human being 
enjoying eating the chocolate.  That is to say, he can construct what 
G.E.  Moore  called  an  organic  unity  and  place  the  value-creating 
relationship  inside  of  it.    (Principia  Ethica  (Cambridge:    Cambridge 
University Press, 1903), Chapter VI.)  The trouble with this strategy is 
that  it  conceals  the  fact  that  the  value  is  really  relational,  and  the 
possibility,  embraced  by  Intersubjectivism,  that  all  values  are  really 
relational.    For  further  discussion  see  my  “Two  Distinctions  in 
Goodness” Philosophical Review 92 (1983):  169-195, especially 190-193. 
xxvi    Of  course  this  way  of  putting  it  assumes  no  one  else  has  any 
desires  about  the  campus  that  could  weigh  against  mine.    In  that 
sense, it assumes that I am the only person in the world who cares 
about the campus.  Some people, when they realize that, are tempted 
to  think  that  under  those  improbable  circumstances  I  would  be  the 
right person to determine what counts as a good state of the campus. 
xxvii Including your happiness or pleasure, which perhaps makes what I 
say here controversial.  I am claiming that if I care about you I want 
your ambitions to be fulfilled, and not only in order to make you happy.  
I  want  them  to  be  satisfied  simply  because  you  do.    This  is  why 
deathbed wishes are entrusted to loved ones.  Of course this does not 
mean that I will never oppose your pursuit of an ambition if I foresee 
that it will make you miserable.  But that is a matter of weighing, not a 
matter  of  refusing  to  give  the  ambition  any  weight  of  its  own.  
Something here depends on one’s views about rationality.  Of course 
there  are  people  who  hold  that  it  is  only  rational  to  fulfill  those 
ambitions  that  will  make  us  happy.    If  you  hold  this  view  about                                                                                                                                              
rationality, you are likely to encourage and help your friends only to do 
what will make them happy, just as you are likely to give up your own 
more  dangerous  ambitions.    But  if  you  hold  that  it  is  sometimes 
rational just to do what you think is important without regard for your 
happiness,  you  are  likely  to  respect  a  friends’  desire  to  do  what  he 
thinks is important without regard to his happiness as well.  Of course 
if you hold  the view  that happiness  just consists  in doing what you 
think is most important, these issues cannot even arise.   
xxviii On  this point  see  also Stephen  Darwall,  Impartial Reason (Ithaca:  
Cornell University Press), p. 139. 
xxix When introducing the idea on PA 29, Nagel writes as if a motivated 
desire were one arrived at through deliberation.  But on his own view 
prudence is a motivated desire, and most of us can hardly be said to 
have  arrived  at  through  deliberation.    You  arrive  at  it  through  the  
simple recognition of the reason - that it is your own future - without 
deliberation.  I am using the term in this looser sense; I do not think 
that most people arrive at their ambitions through deliberation.   
xxx  I am not suggesting that there is something perverted about sexual 
jealousy.    The  desire  to  make  love  to  someone  is  not  primarily  the 
desire  to  be  the  one  who  provides  him  with  a  certain  kind  of 
experience.  The desire to make someone happy can be an expression 
of either morality or of love, but in neither case is it their essence.  For 
further discussion see my “Creating the Kingdom of Ends:  Reciprocity 
and Responsibility in Personal Relations” forthcoming in Philosophical 
Perspectives  6:    Ethics,  edited  by  James  Tomberlin.    Atascadero, 
California:  The Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1992.                                                                                                                                               
xxxi   One may  say that human  talents  and powers are developed and 
refined by these activities, and that this is an objective human good.  
Indeed, when people talk about what they like about these activities, 
these are the things they will talk about.   But this does not mean that 
what they care about is these supposedly objectively valuable features 
of  their  chosen  activities  rather  than  the  particular  activities 
themselves.    Other  activities,  which  the  people  who  value  these 
activities are not always prepared to  substitute for them, may refine 
and develop similar human powers.  And one may even accept these 
other activities as substitutes if it is necessary (as when one turns to a 
less strenuous sport in old age).  But we should not take that to mean 
that the “objective” goods embodied in the activities was all that they 
cared about.  The problem here is like the problem associated with the 
fact that we love particular people even though what we can say we love 
about  them  is  general.    You  love  a  particular  person,  not  just  his 
warmth, intelligence, and sense of humor.  It is not true that any other 
person with these attributes would do just as well, even though it is 
true  that  if he  leaves you, you may  seek  another person with  these 
attributes  to  replace  him.    No  adequate  theory  of  value  can  ignore 
these complex facts.   
xxxii  There are several ways to motivate this thought.  Daniel Warren 
has pointed out to me, in conversation, that without this thought the 
requirement to share ends could be met by someone who took a sort of 
patronizing  attitude  towards  the  ambitions  of  others:    “oh,  well,  you 
like  it,  so  I  suppose we  shall have  to count  it  as good.”  Scott  Kim 
points out that a parallel problem exists on the recipient’s side:  if you                                                                                                                                              
accept  help  from  someone  who  does  not  in  any way  enter  into  your 
ambitions  you  may be  regarding  him  somewhat  instrumentally.    The 
point of these remarks is not to show that there is something wrong 
with  either helping or accepting help among those who do not really 
enter into each other’s interests, but that the moral attitude that is 
required of us is less than perfectly realized.  This in turn shows that 
there  is  a  kind  of  continuum  between  the  sense    of  “shared  ends” 
defined  in  the  previous  paragraph  and  the  sense  defined  in  this 
paragraph.    One  may  share  the  ends  of  others  in  the  sense  of  (i) 
agreeing  to  promote  them  because  they  are  another’s  ends;  (ii)  
trusting that there must really be  something interesting about them 
because they are another’s ends; (iii) seeing what is interesting about 
them; and (iv) coming to have them as your own ends.  I thank Thomas 
Scanlon for prompting me to be clearer about this point, and Amélie 
Rorty for reminding me  of  the  importance  of  the possibility  that  one 
may stop at step (iii); e.g.  one may for instance come to have a much 
better  appreciation  of  what  a  certain  school  of  art  was  trying  to  do 
without actually coming to enjoy the works or find them beautiful.   
xxxiii   See  John  Stuart  Mill,  Utilitarianism  (Indianapolis:    Hackett 
Publishing, 1979), pp. 23-24. 
xxxiv Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis:  Hackett Publishing, 1979),  p. 22. 
xxxv  Williams,  in  Smart  and  Williams,  Utilitarianism  for  and  Against 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 98. 
xxxvi  I think this point is sometimes overlooked in discussions of this 
example.  Williams,  to  be  fair,  specifies  that  the  Indians  are  begging 
Jim  to  accept  the  offer.  (Utilitarianism  for  and  Against  (Cambridge:                                                                                                                                              
Cambridge  University  Press,  1973),  p.  99.)    But  he  obscures  its 
importance when he says that this is “obviously” what they would be 
doing.   
xxxvii This is a familiar move:  when reminded that a person is likely to 
experience a negative moral emotion such as guilt, regret, hesitation, 
or  squeamishness  about  doing  something  which  according  to  our 
theory is right, the philosopher points out that the action in question 
is usually wrong and that it is  therefore healthy to be  equipped with 
some reactions which will make it hard for us to do it or will make us 
think  twice  before  doing  it.    The  assumption  seems  to  be  that  our 
emotions are clunkier, more mechanical, less sensitive to the details 
of  a  situation,  and  altogether  less  refined  than  our  thoughts.    This 
view  seems  to  be  a  byproduct  of  the  modern  conception  of  the 
emotions; the emotions are conceived as feelings or reactions, not as 
perceptions.  Aristotle, for instance, would not have said this about the 
trained emotions of the virtuous person. 
xxxviii  Scheffler,  The  Rejection  of  Consequentialism  (Oxford:    Oxford 
University Press 1982), pp. 14ff. 
xxxix  Ibid. p. 82. 
xl  See note 2. 
xli See Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (Hackett, 
1983) p.37; Prussian Academy  edition p. 430.  For interpretation, see 
my “The Right to Lie:  Kant on Dealing with Evil” (Philosophy and Public 
Affairs  15,  (1986):    pp.    325-349);  and  Onora  O’Neill,  “Between 
Consenting Adults”  (Philosophy and Public Affairs  14 (1985) : pp. 252-
277.                                                                                                                                              
xlii  There are familiar philosophical puzzles about all of these notions.  
This  is  perhaps  especially  true  of  coercion,  notoriously  hard  to 
distinguish  in  any  formal  way  from  bribery  or  the  mere  offer  of  an 
incentive.    This  is  not  the  place  to  take  these  puzzles  up,  but  this 
should pose a problem only for readers who are actually skeptical about 
whether there is such a thing as coercion.   
xliii   That is a remark that needs many  qualifications.   Actual consent - 
in the sense of saying yes - can easily be spurious.  As Onora O’Neill 
argues,  a  better  test  of  whether  someone  was  able  to  consent  is 
whether the person had an authentic opportunity to say no.  See Onora 
O’Neill “Justice, Gender, and International Boundaries” forthcoming in 
The Quality of Life, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen.   Oxford:  
The Clarendon Press, 1992.    
xliv Thomas Scanlon has drawn my attention  to  a footnote  in  Nagel’s 
paper  “War  and  Massacre”    in  which  Nagel  mentions  that  Marshall 
Cohen  says  that  according  to  Nagel’s  view,  shooting  at  someone 
establishes an I-thou relationship.  (see Mortal Questions  (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press,  1979), p. 69).  I agreeing with Cohen - and 
think that so interpreted  Nagel is right .  
xlv  Strictly speaking, this is only an account of what Kant would call 
the “incentive” of morality; we are not obligated until we acknowledge 
the necessity of adopting this incentive as law.   A related point is this:  
several readers, among them Barbara Herman and Arthur Kuflik, have 
pointed  out  to me  that  this  account  says  nothing about why  I must 
recognize the other as a person, only about what follows from the fact 
that  I  do.        For  now  I  can  only  acknowledge  that  the  argument  is                                                                                                                                              
incomplete  in  these  ways.    I  hope  to  say  more  on  these  points 
elsewhere. 
xlvi  A similar point, I think, can be made about Scheffler.   He says that 
it is “natural” to interpret Nozick’s defense of side-constraints as an 
appeal  to  the  disvalue,    the  badness,  of  violating  those  constraints.   
(Scheffler,  p.  88)    But  it  is  only    “natural”  if  you  ignore  Nozick’s 
reminder that a moral constraint doesn’t have to function as a moral 
goal - that is, only if you presuppose that the business of morality is 
the realization of goals.   
xlvii Several readers have suggested to me that I am not really rejecting 
consequentialism but only proposing  an alternative account of what 
we  should aim at:  decent  human relationships.  This  suggestion  is 
similar  to  the  familiar  consequentialist  reply  to  standard 
counterexamples:    “if  justice  matters,  we  can  include  it  among  the 
results.”  That kind of inclusion results in the curious view discussed 
on p. 000:  that we should commit injustice if it will bring about more 
justice.  Scheffler imagines his consequentialist saying:   “And if you 
are  worried  that  a  violation  of  R  [the  requirement]  corrupts  the 
relationship between the agent and the victim, and that the corruption 
of a human relationship is a bad thing, then why isn’t it at least as 
permissible to corrupt one valuable relationship if that is the only way 
to  prevent  the  corruption  of  five  equally  valuable  human 
relationships?”(Scheffler, pp. 89-90) A commitment  to mutual respect 
in  human  relationships  is  not  merely    a  commitment  to  bringing 
respectful relationships about, any more than a commitment to justice 
is merely a commitment to bringing justice about.   For example:  In                                                                                                                                              
the early stages of our friendship, I might be tempted conceal things 
from you in order to help bring about a condition of  mutual trust;  I 
might be afraid  that you will reject me too quickly if you find certain 
things out before you know me better.  But if mutual trust is ever to be 
achieved , the day must come when my calculations about the effects of 
my telling you things stops:  that is what it means for me to trust you.  
The point here is that having decent relationships with people is not 
the same as bringing them about, and to some extent is inconsistent 
with regarding them as things to be brought about.  And my suggestion 
in this paper is that having decent human relationships, not bringing 
them about, is the primary concern of morality. 
xlviii Nor is it an accident that many of my own examples in this paper, 
especially the ones concerning Jim and the Indians, focus on what the 
protagonists  might  say  to  each  other.    Many  of  Rawls’s  arguments 
invite us to imagine people talking to each other, to consider what it 
would be like to say certain things to another person.   His argument 
against  the  utilitarian  account  of  what  is  wrong  with  slavery,  in 
“Justice as Reciprocity” (in Utilitarianism with Critical Essays, ed. Samuel 
Gorovitz,  Bobbs-Merrill,  1971,  pp.  242-268)  in  effect  invites  us  to 
consider the absurdity of a slaveholder who says to a protesting slave:  
“But my gains outweigh your losses!”  His consideration of the effects 
of  publicizing  principles  of  justice  on  people’s  self-respect  are  also 
related  to  this  theme.    (Theory  of  Justice,  Harvard  University  Press, 
1971, pp. 177ff.)   Part of the appeal of the difference principle is that it 
is  the  source  of  justifications  which you  can  offer  to anyone  without 
embarrassment.   